cmp_vfy.c

Last change on this file was 109052, checked in by vboxsync, 3 weeks ago
openssl-3.4.1: Applied our changes, regenerated files, added missing files and functions. This time with a three way merge. bugref:10890
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1	/*
2	* Copyright 2007-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3	* Copyright Nokia 2007-2020
4	* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2020
5	*
6	* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7	* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8	* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9	* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10	*/
11
12	/* CMP functions for PKIMessage checking */
13
14	#include "cmp_local.h"
15	#include <openssl/cmp_util.h>
16
17	/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
18	#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
19	#include <openssl/cmp.h>
20	#include <openssl/crmf.h>
21	#include <openssl/err.h>
22	#include <openssl/x509.h>
23
24	/* Verify a message protected by signature according to RFC section 5.1.3.3 */
25	static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx,
26	const OSSL_CMP_MSG msg, X509 cert)
27	{
28	OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
29	EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
30	BIO *bio;
31	int res = 0;
32
33	if (!ossl_assert(cmp_ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && cert != NULL))
34	return 0;
35
36	bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* may be NULL */
37	if (bio == NULL)
38	return 0;
39	/* verify that keyUsage, if present, contains digitalSignature */
40	if (!cmp_ctx->ignore_keyusage
41	&& (X509_get_key_usage(cert) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) {
42	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE);
43	goto sig_err;
44	}
45
46	pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
47	if (pubkey == NULL) {
48	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY);
49	goto sig_err;
50	}
51
52	prot_part.header = msg->header;
53	prot_part.body = msg->body;
54
55	if (ASN1_item_verify_ex(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART),
56	msg->header->protectionAlg, msg->protection,
57	&prot_part, NULL, pubkey, cmp_ctx->libctx,
58	cmp_ctx->propq) > 0) {
59	res = 1;
60	goto end;
61	}
62
63	sig_err:
64	res = ossl_x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS);
65	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_SIGNATURE);
66	if (res)
67	ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio);
68	res = 0;
69
70	end:
71	EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
72	BIO_free(bio);
73
74	return res;
75	}
76
77	/* Verify a message protected with PBMAC */
78	static int verify_PBMAC(OSSL_CMP_CTX ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG msg)
79	{
80	ASN1_BIT_STRING *protection = NULL;
81	int valid = 0;
82
83	/* generate expected protection for the message */
84	if ((protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL)
85	return 0; /* failed to generate protection string! */
86
87	valid = msg->protection != NULL && msg->protection->length >= 0
88	&& msg->protection->type == protection->type
89	&& msg->protection->length == protection->length
90	&& CRYPTO_memcmp(msg->protection->data, protection->data,
91	protection->length) == 0;
92	ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(protection);
93	if (!valid)
94	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_PBM_VALUE);
95
96	return valid;
97	}
98
99	/*-
100	* Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted
101	* certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function)
102	* and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx.
103	*
104	* Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
105	*/
106	int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
107	X509_STORE trusted_store, X509 cert)
108	{
109	int valid = 0;
110	X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL;
111	int err;
112
113	if (ctx == NULL \|\| cert == NULL) {
114	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
115	return 0;
116	}
117
118	if (trusted_store == NULL) {
119	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE);
120	return 0;
121	}
122
123	if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) == NULL
124	\|\| !X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, trusted_store,
125	cert, ctx->untrusted))
126	goto err;
127
128	valid = X509_verify_cert(csc) > 0;
129
130	/* make sure suitable error is queued even if callback did not do */
131	err = ERR_peek_last_error();
132	if (!valid && ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE)
133	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
134
135	err:
136	/* directly output any fresh errors, needed for check_msg_find_cert() */
137	OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
138	X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
139	return valid;
140	}
141
142	static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE ts, X509 cert, int err)
143	{
144	X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb;
145	X509_STORE_CTX *csc;
146	int ok = 0;
147
148	if (ts == NULL \|\| (verify_cb = X509_STORE_get_verify_cb(ts)) == NULL)
149	return ok;
150	if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new()) != NULL
151	&& X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, ts, cert, NULL)) {
152	X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(csc, err);
153	X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(csc, cert);
154	ok = (*verify_cb)(0, csc);
155	}
156	X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
157	return ok;
158	}
159
160	/* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */
161	static int check_name(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int log_success,
162	const char actual_desc, const X509_NAME actual_name,
163	const char expect_desc, const X509_NAME expect_name)
164	{
165	char *str;
166
167	if (expect_name == NULL)
168	return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
169
170	/* make sure that a matching name is there */
171	if (actual_name == NULL) {
172	ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc);
173	return 0;
174	}
175	str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0);
176	if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0) {
177	if (log_success && str != NULL)
178	ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " %s matches %s: %s",
179	actual_desc, expect_desc, str);
180	OPENSSL_free(str);
181	return 1;
182	}
183
184	if (str != NULL)
185	ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str);
186	OPENSSL_free(str);
187	if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
188	ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " does not match %s = %s", expect_desc, str);
189	OPENSSL_free(str);
190	return 0;
191	}
192
193	/* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */
194	static int check_kid(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
195	const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid,
196	const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid)
197	{
198	char *str;
199
200	if (skid == NULL)
201	return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
202
203	/* make sure that the expected subject key identifier is there */
204	if (ckid == NULL) {
205	ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate");
206	return 0;
207	}
208	str = i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, ckid);
209	if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0) {
210	if (str != NULL)
211	ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subjectKID matches senderKID: %s", str);
212	OPENSSL_free(str);
213	return 1;
214	}
215
216	if (str != NULL)
217	ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", str);
218	OPENSSL_free(str);
219	if ((str = i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, skid)) != NULL)
220	ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", str);
221	OPENSSL_free(str);
222	return 0;
223	}
224
225	static int already_checked(const X509 *cert,
226	const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
227	{
228	int i;
229
230	for (i = sk_X509_num(already_checked /* may be NULL */); i > 0; i--)
231	if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(already_checked, i - 1), cert) == 0)
232	return 1;
233	return 0;
234	}
235
236	/*-
237	* Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message.
238	* The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg,
239	* and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL).
240	* Note that cert revocation etc. is checked by OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path().
241	*
242	* Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1.
243	*/
244	static int cert_acceptable(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
245	const char desc1, const char desc2, X509 *cert,
246	const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
247	const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
248	const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
249	{
250	X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted;
251	int self_issued = X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK;
252	char *str;
253	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL;
254	int time_cmp;
255
256	ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " considering %s%s %s with..",
257	self_issued ? "self-issued ": "", desc1, desc2);
258	if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
259	ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", str);
260	OPENSSL_free(str);
261	if (!self_issued) {
262	str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0);
263	if (str != NULL)
264	ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", str);
265	OPENSSL_free(str);
266	}
267
268	if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1)
269	\|\| already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) {
270	ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert has already been checked");
271	return 0;
272	}
273
274	time_cmp = X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm, X509_get0_notBefore(cert),
275	X509_get0_notAfter(cert));
276	if (time_cmp != 0) {
277	int err = time_cmp > 0 ? X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
278	: X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
279
280	ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, time_cmp > 0 ? "cert has expired"
281	: "cert is not yet valid");
282	if (ctx->log_cb != NULL /* logging not temporarily disabled */
283	&& verify_cb_cert(ts, cert, err) <= 0)
284	return 0;
285	}
286
287	if (!check_name(ctx, 1,
288	"cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert),
289	"sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName))
290	return 0;
291
292	if (!check_kid(ctx, X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert), msg->header->senderKID))
293	return 0;
294	/* prevent misleading error later in case x509v3_cache_extensions() fails */
295	if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) {
296	ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "cert appears to be invalid");
297	return 0;
298	}
299	if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, cert)) {
300	ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
301	return 0;
302	}
303	/* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */
304	ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable");
305	return 1;
306	}
307
308	static int check_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX ctx, X509_STORE store,
309	X509 *scrt)
310	{
311	if (OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt))
312	return 1;
313
314	ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
315	"msg signature validates but cert path validation failed");
316	return 0;
317	}
318
319	/*
320	* Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security
321	* (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP messages
322	* and if the ctx option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates
323	* from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert -
324	* provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate
325	*/
326	static int check_cert_path_3gpp(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
327	const OSSL_CMP_MSG msg, X509 scrt)
328	{
329	int valid = 0;
330	X509_STORE *store;
331
332	if (!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR)
333	return 0;
334
335	if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL
336	\|\| !ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts,
337	1 /* self-issued only */))
338	goto err;
339
340	/* store does not include CRLs */
341	valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt);
342	if (!valid) {
343	ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
344	"also exceptional 3GPP mode cert path validation failed");
345	} else {
346	/*
347	* verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which assumed rid ==
348	* OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID) can also be validated with the same trusted store
349	*/
350	OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep =
351	ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip,
352	OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID);
353	X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_cert(ctx, crep);
354
355	/*
356	* maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches
357	* errors
358	*/
359	valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt);
360	X509_free(newcrt);
361	}
362
363	err:
364	X509_STORE_free(store);
365	return valid;
366	}
367
368	static int check_msg_given_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX ctx, X509 cert,
369	const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
370	{
371	return cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert",
372	cert, NULL, NULL, msg)
373	&& (check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert)
374	\|\| check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert));
375	}
376
377	/*-
378	* Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode.
379	* If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts.
380	* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert().
381	*/
382	static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX ctx, const STACK_OF(X509) certs,
383	const char *desc,
384	const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
385	const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
386	const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int mode_3gpp)
387	{
388	int in_extraCerts = already_checked1 == NULL;
389	int n_acceptable_certs = 0;
390	int i;
391
392	if (sk_X509_num(certs) <= 0) {
393	ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "no %s", desc);
394	return 0;
395	}
396
397	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { /* certs may be NULL */
398	X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
399
400	if (!ossl_assert(cert != NULL))
401	return 0;
402	if (!cert_acceptable(ctx, "cert from", desc, cert,
403	already_checked1, already_checked2, msg))
404	continue;
405	n_acceptable_certs++;
406	if (mode_3gpp ? check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert)
407	: check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert)) {
408	/* store successful sender cert for further msgs in transaction */
409	return ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert(ctx, cert);
410	}
411	}
412	if (in_extraCerts && n_acceptable_certs == 0)
413	ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no acceptable cert in extraCerts");
414	return 0;
415	}
416
417	/*-
418	* Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted, which should include extraCerts
419	* at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx.
420	* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert().
421	*/
422	static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG msg,
423	int mode_3gpp)
424	{
425	int ret = 0;
426
427	if (ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR
428	&& OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg) == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP)
429	ossl_cmp_info(ctx, mode_3gpp ?
430	"normal mode failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts"
431	: "trying first normal mode using trust store");
432	else if (mode_3gpp)
433	return 0;
434
435	if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts",
436	NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
437	return 1;
438	if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, ctx->untrusted, "untrusted certs",
439	msg->extraCerts, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
440	return 1;
441
442	if (ctx->trusted == NULL) {
443	ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, mode_3gpp ? "no self-issued extraCerts"
444	: "no trusted store");
445	} else {
446	STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(ctx->trusted);
447
448	ret = check_msg_with_certs(ctx, trusted,
449	mode_3gpp ? "self-issued extraCerts"
450	: "certs in trusted store",
451	msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted,
452	msg, mode_3gpp);
453	OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(trusted);
454	}
455	return ret;
456	}
457
458	/*-
459	* Verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert.
460	* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert().
461	*/
462	static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG msg)
463	{
464	X509 scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; / previous successful sender cert */
465	GENERAL_NAME *sender = msg->header->sender;
466	char *sname = NULL;
467	char *skid_str = NULL;
468	const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = msg->header->senderKID;
469	OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb;
470	int res = 0;
471
472	if (sender == NULL \|\| msg->body == NULL)
473	return 0; /* other NULL cases already have been checked */
474	if (sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
475	/* So far, only X509_NAME is supported */
476	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
477	return 0;
478	}
479
480	/* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
481	OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
482
483	/* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
484	(void)ERR_set_mark();
485	ctx->log_cb = NULL; /* temporarily disable logging */
486
487	/*
488	* try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction,
489	* for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out
490	*/
491	if (scrt != NULL) {
492	if (check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg)) {
493	ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
494	(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
495	return 1;
496	}
497	/* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */
498	(void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
499	/* re-do the above check (just) for adding diagnostic information */
500	ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
501	"trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert");
502	(void)check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg);
503	}
504
505	res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
506	\|\| check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
507	ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
508	if (res) {
509	/* discard any diagnostic information on trying to use certs */
510	(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
511	goto end;
512	}
513	/* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */
514	(void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
515
516	sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0);
517	skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL : i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, skid);
518	if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) {
519	ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with a valid cert that..");
520	if (sname != NULL)
521	ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender = %s", sname);
522	if (skid_str != NULL)
523	ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str);
524	else
525	ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID");
526	/* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */
527	(void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */);
528	(void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
529	}
530
531	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT);
532	if (sname != NULL) {
533	ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, "for msg sender name = ");
534	ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, sname);
535	}
536	if (skid_str != NULL) {
537	ERR_add_error_txt(" and ", "for msg senderKID = ");
538	ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, skid_str);
539	}
540
541	end:
542	OPENSSL_free(sname);
543	OPENSSL_free(skid_str);
544	return res;
545	}
546
547	/*-
548	* Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password-
549	* based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm,
550	* the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert,
551	* else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted, in ctx->trusted
552	* (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted.
553	* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert().
554	*
555	* If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg,
556	* the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts
557	* if a self-issued certificate is found there that can be used to
558	* validate the enrolled certificate returned in the IP.
559	* This is according to the need given in 3GPP TS 33.310.
560	*
561	* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed.
562	*/
563	int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG msg)
564	{
565	X509 *scrt;
566
567	ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "validating CMP message");
568	if (ctx == NULL \|\| msg == NULL
569	\|\| msg->header == NULL \|\| msg->body == NULL) {
570	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
571	return 0;
572	}
573
574	if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL /* unprotected message */
575	\|\| msg->protection == NULL \|\| msg->protection->data == NULL) {
576	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
577	return 0;
578	}
579
580	switch (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(msg->header)) {
581	/* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */
582	case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC:
583	if (ctx->secretValue == NULL) {
584	ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "no secret available for verifying PBM-based CMP message protection");
585	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_SECRET);
586	return 0;
587	}
588	if (verify_PBMAC(ctx, msg)) {
589	/*
590	* RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
591	* "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
592	* the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
593	* certificate by the initiator.'
594	*/
595	switch (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg)) {
596	case -1:
597	return 0;
598	case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
599	case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
600	case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
601	case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
602	if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
603	STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
604	/* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
605
606	if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
607	/* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
608	return 0;
609	}
610	break;
611	default:
612	break;
613	}
614	ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
615	"successfully validated PBM-based CMP message protection");
616	return 1;
617	}
618	ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "verifying PBM-based CMP message protection failed");
619	break;
620
621	/*
622	* 5.1.3.2 DH Key Pairs
623	* Not yet supported
624	*/
625	case NID_id_DHBasedMac:
626	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION_ALG_DHBASEDMAC);
627	break;
628
629	/*
630	* 5.1.3.3. Signature
631	*/
632	default:
633	scrt = ctx->srvCert;
634	if (scrt == NULL) {
635	if (ctx->trusted == NULL && ctx->secretValue != NULL) {
636	ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "no trust store nor pinned server cert available for verifying signature-based CMP message protection");
637	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_ANCHOR);
638	return 0;
639	}
640	if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg)) {
641	ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
642	"successfully validated signature-based CMP message protection using trust store");
643	return 1;
644	}
645	} else { /* use pinned sender cert */
646	/* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */
647	if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) {
648	ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
649	"successfully validated signature-based CMP message protection using pinned server cert");
650	return ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert(ctx, scrt);
651	}
652	ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "CMP message signature verification failed");
653	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG);
654	}
655	break;
656	}
657	return 0;
658	}
659
660	static int check_transactionID_or_nonce(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *expected,
661	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *actual, int reason)
662	{
663	if (expected != NULL
664	&& (actual == NULL \|\| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(expected, actual) != 0)) {
665	#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
666	char expected_str, actual_str;
667
668	expected_str = i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, expected);
669	actual_str = actual == NULL ? NULL: i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, actual);
670	ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CMP, reason,
671	"expected = %s, actual = %s",
672	expected_str == NULL ? "?" : expected_str,
673	actual == NULL ? "(none)" :
674	actual_str == NULL ? "?" : actual_str);
675	OPENSSL_free(expected_str);
676	OPENSSL_free(actual_str);
677	return 0;
678	#endif
679	}
680	return 1;
681	}
682
683	/*-
684	* Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client)
685	* Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted.
686	*
687	* Ensures that:
688	* its sender is of appropriate type (currently only X509_NAME) and
689	* matches any expected sender or srvCert subject given in the ctx
690	* it has a valid body type
691	* its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function
692	* is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument)
693	* its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any)
694	* its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any)
695	*
696	* If everything is fine:
697	* learns the senderNonce from the received message,
698	* learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx,
699	* and makes any certs in caPubs directly trusted.
700	*
701	* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
702	*/
703	int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG msg,
704	ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg)
705	{
706	OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr;
707	const X509_NAME *expected_sender;
708	int num_untrusted, num_added, res;
709
710	if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && msg->header != NULL))
711	return 0;
712	hdr = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg);
713
714	/* If expected_sender is given, validate sender name of received msg */
715	expected_sender = ctx->expected_sender;
716	if (expected_sender == NULL && ctx->srvCert != NULL)
717	expected_sender = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert);
718	if (expected_sender != NULL) {
719	const X509_NAME *actual_sender;
720	char *str;
721
722	if (hdr->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
723	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
724	return 0;
725	}
726	actual_sender = hdr->sender->d.directoryName;
727	/*
728	* Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name.
729	* Mitigates risk of accepting misused PBM secret or
730	* misused certificate of an unauthorized entity of a trusted hierarchy.
731	*/
732	if (!check_name(ctx, 0, "sender DN field", actual_sender,
733	"expected sender", expected_sender)) {
734	str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_sender, NULL, 0);
735	ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_SENDER,
736	str != NULL ? str : "<unknown>");
737	OPENSSL_free(str);
738	return 0;
739	}
740	}
741	/* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */
742
743	num_added = sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts);
744	if (num_added > 10)
745	ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "received CMP message contains %d extraCerts",
746	num_added);
747	/*
748	* Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for use in OSSL_CMP_validate_msg()
749	* and for future use, such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
750	* the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
751	* Note that it does not help validating the message before storing the
752	* extraCerts because they do not belong to the protected msg part anyway.
753	* The extraCerts are prepended. Allows simple removal if they shall not be
754	* cached. Also they get used first, which is likely good for efficiency.
755	*/
756	num_untrusted = ctx->untrusted == NULL ? 0 : sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted);
757	res = ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts,
758	/* this allows self-signed certs */
759	X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF \| X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
760	\| X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND);
761	num_added = (ctx->untrusted == NULL ? 0 : sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted))
762	- num_untrusted;
763	if (!res) {
764	while (num_added-- > 0)
765	X509_free(sk_X509_shift(ctx->untrusted));
766	return 0;
767	}
768
769	if (hdr->protectionAlg != NULL)
770	res = OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg)
771	/* explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection: */
772	\|\| (cb != NULL && (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) > 0);
773	else
774	/* explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection: */
775	res = cb != NULL && (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) > 0;
776	#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
777	res = 1; /* support more aggressive fuzzing by letting invalid msg pass */
778	#endif
779
780	/* remove extraCerts again if not caching */
781	if (ctx->noCacheExtraCerts)
782	while (num_added-- > 0)
783	X509_free(sk_X509_shift(ctx->untrusted));
784
785	if (!res) {
786	if (hdr->protectionAlg != NULL)
787	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
788	else
789	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
790	return 0;
791	}
792
793	/* check CMP version number in header */
794	if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(hdr) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO_2
795	&& ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(hdr) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO_3) {
796	#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
797	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO);
798	return 0;
799	#endif
800	}
801
802	if (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg) < 0) {
803	#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
804	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
805	return 0;
806	#endif
807	}
808
809	/* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */
810	if (!check_transactionID_or_nonce(ctx->transactionID, hdr->transactionID,
811	CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED))
812	return 0;
813
814	/*
815	* enable clearing irrelevant errors
816	* in attempts to validate recipient nonce in case of delayed delivery.
817	*/
818	(void)ERR_set_mark();
819	/* compare received nonce with the one we sent */
820	if (!check_transactionID_or_nonce(ctx->senderNonce, hdr->recipNonce,
821	CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED)) {
822	/* check if we are polling and received final response */
823	if (ctx->first_senderNonce == NULL
824	\|\| OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg) == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREP
825	/* compare received nonce with our sender nonce at poll start */
826	\|\| !check_transactionID_or_nonce(ctx->first_senderNonce,
827	hdr->recipNonce,
828	CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED)) {
829	(void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
830	return 0;
831	}
832	}
833	(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
834
835	/* if not yet present, learn transactionID */
836	if (ctx->transactionID == NULL
837	&& !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, hdr->transactionID))
838	return 0;
839
840	/*
841	* RFC 4210 section 5.1.1 states: the recipNonce is copied from
842	* the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction.
843	* --> Store for setting in next message
844	*/
845	if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, hdr->senderNonce))
846	return 0;
847
848	if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(hdr) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) {
849	/*
850	* RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
851	* "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
852	* the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
853	* certificate by the initiator.'
854	*/
855	switch (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg)) {
856	case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
857	case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
858	case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
859	case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
860	if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
861	STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
862	/* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
863
864	if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
865	/* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
866	return 0;
867	}
868	break;
869	default:
870	break;
871	}
872	}
873	return 1;
874	}
875
876	int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
877	const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int acceptRAVerified)
878	{
879	if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL))
880	return 0;
881	switch (msg->body->type) {
882	case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR:
883	{
884	X509_REQ *req = msg->body->value.p10cr;
885
886	if (X509_REQ_verify_ex(req, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req), ctx->libctx,
887	ctx->propq) <= 0) {
888	#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
889	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED);
890	return 0;
891	#endif
892	}
893	}
894	break;
895	case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR:
896	case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR:
897	case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR:
898	if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(msg->body->value.ir, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID,
899	acceptRAVerified,
900	ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) {
901	#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
902	return 0;
903	#endif
904	}
905	break;
906	default:
907	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
908	return 0;
909	}
910	return 1;
911	}

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source: vbox/trunk/src/libs/openssl-3.4.1/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c

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